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Boring European Borders?! Integration and Mobility across Borders1 
 
Martin van der Velde 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the apparent stubbornness of immobility that exists in the European Union. It 
starts from the observation that the apparent abolishing of borders has not led to the supposed increase in cross-
border interaction. Two concepts are introduced, indifference and unfamiliarity, this way trying to understand 
border effects, especially in Europe and the European Union. From this it is concluded that borders are much 
more than only technical barriers. Also prominent EU discourses in which debordering and homogenization will 
lead automatically to an increase in mobility and higher levels of interaction are challenged. It is concluded that 
it is important to make people to consider the “other” side of the border, including its differences and 
(un)familiarity, as a relevant precondition for interaction. 
 
Introduction 
 
This somewhat provocative title attempts to highlight the ambivalence towards borders and 
what they stand for in the European Union (EU) and Europe (which of course are not the same). 
When confronted with other borders in the world, EU inner borders seem to be particularly boring, as 
for many (especially when coming from outside the EU), they seem to have become almost irrelevant. 
Of course a completely different story can be told when dealing with the outer borders, which have 
hardened and become more significant in recent years. In our perspective, however, EU inner borders 
are also still very relevant when trying to understand the dynamics of, and within the EU. This paper 
therefore would like to address especially two subtle aspects tied to borders, indifference and 
(un)familiarity, which in this paper are considered to be crucial to understanding the dynamics at and 
across borders and seem to be in particular pertinent in the EU. 
The notion of borders plays a central role in the origins as well as the dynamics of the 
European Union. Borders (not only in Europe) can be considered to be the scars of history.2 The 
original goal in establishing the EU was to prevent new conflicts by stimulating the integration and 
cohesion of and cooperation between the countries of Europe. Immediately this was translated into a 
desire to eliminate the inner borders of what eventually was to become the EU. The main reason for 
                                                           
 Martin van der Velde is Professor at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, Human Geography, Nijmegen 
School of Management, Radboud University Nijmegen. This paper was first presented at the Second 
International Winter Symposium of the Global COE Program “Reshaping Japan’s Border Studies – De-
Areanization of Border Studies: The ‘Greater Eurasia’ and its Neighbours,” December 4-5 2010. 
1 The title is based on the dissertation “Stories of the ‘Boring Border’” from Anke Strüver (Münster: LIT, 2005). 
2 Alfred Mozer, “Entwicklungspolitik zu Hause” in Claus Schöndube (ed.), Entwicklungsregionen in der EWG: 
Ursache un Ausmaß der wirtschaftlichen Benachteiligung (Bad Honnef: Osang Verlag, 1973). 
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this was that they were considered to hamper the integration process, mainly because they had a 
negative influence on mobility. Border regions became the laboratories of EU-integration, resulting in 
for instance the establishment of special programs specifically aiming at cross-border cooperation in 
border regions. Here probably the most well-known is the Interreg-program, which is currently in its 
fourth cycle and has been renamed into European Territorial Co-operation objective.3 
One important reason for the European Commission (EC) to stimulate mobility and 
interaction and therewith to strive for the breaking down of borders is that this is considered to be an 
important instrument to create economic development and cohesion (Figure 1). From the observation 
that EU-territory is still prone to economic disparities, it should come as no surprise that much effort 
is put into facilitating mobility. As borders are considered to stand in the way of this effort according 
to the European Commission, they should be eliminated. In an EU-discourse this should 
automatically increase the level of interaction and consequently economic development and cohesion. 
Notwithstanding this discourse mobility levels have not risen to the level the EC had wished 
for. 2006 was even declared the year of workers’ mobility, in order to stimulate mobility and get it 
closer to the levels witnessed in the U.S., where it is much higher. The high levels of IMmobility on 
the labour market have even been called “labour mobility,” Europe’s economic oxymoron. 4 
Apparently eliminating borders is not enough to get the people on the move. People are still rather 
immobile. This leads us to the two central questions addressed in this paper: 
                                                           
3 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/index_en.htm accessed August 25 2011. 
4 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/economy-lab/carl-mortished/labour-mobility-
europes-economic-oxymoron/article1727275/ accessed August 25 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  Cohesion through Interaction 
Source: Martin van der Velde, and Egbert Wever, “Border and Labour Market,”The Romanian Economic Journal, 8 
(2005) pp.139-151. 
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• How can this relative immobility be explained in relation to borders? 
• How can cross-border mobility be supported in ways other than through “traditional” EU-
practices? 
 
EU Borders 
 
But before doing that it might be good to address the different kind of borders we see in 
Europe. In general, referring to Oscar Martinez’s attempt to categorise borders,5 we distinguish four 
types of borderlands. 
• “Alienated borderlands,” created by a border that does not allow any cross-border 
interaction. This situation exists when neighbouring countries have serious conflicts, the 
border between North and South Korea being an example. There are not many cases of 
these kinds of borders, though for short periods of time, certain borders may be completely 
sealed.  
• “Coexistent borderlands,” a border where in a certain sense there are conflicts or different 
interests too but they are less problematic, and manageable. Such borders allow for 
controlled cross-border interaction.  
• “Interdependent borderlands” are regions with a border between neighbouring states that 
have stable relations. This border allows for a significant amount of exchange, although 
there is not yet a situation of free flow of goods or persons.  
• “Integrated borderlands,” a situation where a border has in fact been eliminated, implying 
the free flow of goods and labour.  
 
Following this taxonomy of borderlands, in Europe there are mainly interdependent and 
integrated borderlands.  
 
The EU interdependent borderlands 
 
Within Europe at least four cases of “interdependent borders” do exist. An analogy of the 
“mother of all borders,” the US-Mexican border, is the Spanish-Moroccan border surrounding the 
Spanish enclaves in Africa. This is a heavily protected and militarised border. Maybe it is even better 
to call this border co-existent, in the sense that there are clearly differing interests. Official interaction 
across the border is very limited and controlled. 
We find examples of the second case in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean, where the 
authorities in countries like Spain, Italy and Greece desperately try to prevent illegal immigration 
largely from North Africa. In recent years the EU-border police FRONTEX (European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
                                                           
5 Oscar J. Martinez, Border People. Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Tucson: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1994). 
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European Union) has been relatively successful (of course depending on the perspective) in closing 
the route via the Canary Islands.6 Some years ago tens of thousands of undocumented migrants used 
this route to try and get into the EU. The route via Lampedusa towards Italy has until recently been 
drastically curtailed through bilateral agreements with Libya for instance.  
The third case of interdependent borderlands is the new EU outer-border at the Eastern 
fringe, where massive investments are implemented to help the new member states in reinforcing 
“Fortress Europe.” Here recently the Greek-Turkish borders have attracted much attention, where 
Greece asked for FRONTEX assistance to assist them in guarding the outer border. For the first time 
the Rapid Border Intervention Team (RABIT) was deployed.7 This “unit” was established by the EU 
to assist member states in case of acute problems with regard to controlling especially undocumented 
migration. The pressure on this land border is partly the consequence of sealing other routes and 
options. 
A fourth type that at least looks less grim and is supposed to be temporary are parts of the 
new inner-border, which came into existence with the entrance of new member states 2004 and 2007. 
For these countries, although within the EU, labour-mobility in particular is in some cases still 
controlled. Along all four types of “interdependent borders” we see that just as in the US, the EU-
member states fear that a big influx of workers will disturb their “home” labour market, resulting in 
the unemployment of their “own” workers.8 Discussions around the recent EU expansion illustrate 
these fears. Although the EU stands for free movement of goods, capital and labour, the old EU 
members (EU-15) decided that individual countries could establish a transitional period of several 
years (Germany and Austria seven years) in which they could restrict the inflow of workers from new 
member states that acceded in 2004 like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The 2007 
accession states, Romania and Bulgaria, are still confronted with transitional measures. The fears are 
even bigger for the inflow of African workers. As along the Mexican border, many of these African 
workers risk their lives in this case by crossing the Mediterranean in small unsafe boats to reach the 
“right side” of the border. For them too, the supposed availability of jobs is the main motive to take 
this dangerous and unsure step. 
 
The EU integrated borderlands 
 
In general we can regard especially the “old” inner borders very much as integrated 
borderlands. The countries involved are not a homogenous group though. Some compare Europe with 
a Medieval Empire,9 where there are shifting “loyaties” and memberships. When looking at three 
major agreements: the EU, Euro, and Schengen, we see different alliances, with different 
                                                           
6 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art68.html accessed August 28 2011. 
7 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/situation_at_the_external_border/art25.html accessed August 25 2011. 
8 Roos Pijpers, “‘Help! The Poles are Coming’: Narrating a Contemporary Moral Panic,” Geografiska Annaler: 
Series B, Human Geography 88 (2006) pp.91-103. 
9 Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
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consequences for the borders that are involved (Figure 2). 
But even if we look at the most “integrated” countries an interesting picture can be seen 
when looking at mobility patterns. Regarding the mobility in Europe in general and the levels of 
cross-border mobility in particular, it is obvious that Europeans are not “particularly nomadic.”10 One 
even could say that immobility is “…a strong and persistent behavioural strategy for the large 
majority of the population.”11 This statement is confirmed by the results obtained from the regularly 
updated Eurobarometer on the opinion of the citizens of the EU. From one of the 2001 barometers, it 
appears that no more than 1.7 per cent of all respondents had moved to another country within the EU 
in the past decade.12 However, there are considerable differences between the member states with the 
lowest figure in Ireland (less than half a per cent) and the highest in the Scandinavian countries 
(Finland 3 per cent, Denmark a little over 4 per cent and Sweden 5 per cent). Given this low level of 
mobility it is no surprise that less than 2 per cent of the working population in the member states of 
the EU comes from other EU countries.13 Although this share has witnessed a steady increase, it is 
                                                           
10  European Opinion Research Group, The Social Situation in the European Union (2001), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/ ebs_148_en.pdf accessed August 6 2005. 
11 Peter A. Fischer, Einar Holm, Gunnar Malmberg and Thomas Straubhaar, Why do People Stay? Insider 
Advantages and Immobility, HWWA Discussion Paper 112 (Hamburg:Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv, 
2000) p.32. 
12  European Opinion Research Group, The Social Situation in the European Union (2001), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/ ebs_148_en.pdf accessed August 6 2005. 
13 Eurostat, Labour Force Survey: Results 2001 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Member states of the EU-, Euro-, and Schengen-zones 
Adapted from the “Passport to Europe” (part of the Exhibition “The Image of Europe” 2004) 
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still not very impressive. More recent data does not show major changes. 
In these figures only migratory patterns are represented. However, even when cross-border 
commuting is added, the picture does not really change. In a border region defined as the NUTS-3 
regions (the smallest administrative region for which Eurostat provides statistical data), located 
immediately at a national border, only about 2 per cent of the labour force in the EU-15 commutes 
across borders. In absolute figures in 2007, only 660,000 workers commute to another country.14 Here 
too, considerable differences can be noticed. If this is the case in the EU-15, with a quite long history 
of debordering, it might be expected that this might also happen in an enlarging EU. In the accession 
states that joined the EU in 2004 commuting is higher. About 7 per cent of the workers commute 
across the border. This however could be a temporary effect of opening the border. In general the 
overall picture is one of low intensities across the inner borders of the EU. 
As this is still considered to be a major obstacle for European integration, this paper would like 
to discuss the two concepts mentioned in the introduction: indifference and unfamiliarity. Both concepts 
are linked to a conception and interpretation of borders, where they are regarded as dynamic instead of 
“static”, as mental constructs or borders in the mind, and provide the region with an ambivalent, Janus-
faced character. They can both be repelling and attracting, barriers and opportunities.15 
 
Indifference16 
 
The reason why we have introduced the issue of indifference can be found in our conviction 
that it is important for understanding the relative low levels of immobility in the EU. This concept has 
been discussed and illustrated several times.17 
Often theories explaining mobility are used in order to explain a picture of high immobility. 
Most of the time, the labour market is regarded as a kind of system that is in the process towards a 
state of equilibrium between supply and demand. Viewed in this perspective, disequilibria are 
regarded only as a temporary phenomenon. They will be levelled off in due course by some kind of 
mobility. Mobility is thus regarded as the “big equaliser,” playing a crucial role in the functioning of 
labour markets. Often the mobility-approach departs from the assumption formulated in the 1880s by 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Communities, 2002). 
14 MKW/Empirica, Scientific Report on the Mobility of Cross-Border Workers within the EU-27/EEA/EFTA 
Countries (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=3459&langId=en accessed December 18 2011. 
15 Henk van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer, “B/ordering Space” in Henk van Houtum, 
Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer (eds.), B/ordering space (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) pp. 1-13. 
16 This part is a slightly adapted part of a chapter in an edited volume on borders and economic behaviour, 
Martin van der Velde, Manfred Janssen and Henk van Houtum, “Job Mobility in the Dutch-German Regional 
Labour Market. The Threshold of Indifference” in Gerrit van Vilsteren and Egbert Wever (eds.), Borders and 
economic behaviour in Europe (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2005) pp.77-96. 
17 See e.g. Martin van der Velde, and Henk van Houtum, “The Threshold of Indifference; Rethinking Immobility 
in Explaining Cross-border Labour Mobility,” Review of Regional Research 24 (2004) pp.39-49; Henk Van 
Houtum and Martin van der Velde, “The Power of Cross-border Labour Market Immobility,” Tijdschrift voor 
Economische en Sociale Geografie 95 (2004) pp.100-107. 
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Ravenstein18 that: The basic principle for migration-models is regional wage differences. Since then, 
migration-models and mobility-models have become increasingly complex (e.g. by including 
concepts such as human capital, risk of not achieving success, and bounded rationality), but they still 
depart from the assumption that an actor is to be regarded as an homo economicus, acting upon 
impulses (such as wage differences) in a rationally predictable way. The result is basically a push-pull 
model, in which factors are taken into account, that make people move from one place to another. In 
general these kinds of models overestimate the level of mobility. Given the fact that the border is still 
a (mental) barrier, cross-border mobility is overestimated even more. 
When immobility is indeed the rule, it certainly would make sense to emphasise the factors 
that make people stay. Based on the seminal work of Straubhaar from 1988, an interesting and 
promising attempt was the development of the “insiders” advantage approach.19 This approach tries 
to attach a particular economic value to being immobile, by introducing “keep”-factors. First of all 
these factors are related to working-practices. In this respect someone experiences all kinds of “sunk-
benefits,” such as routines, corporate embeddedness, insider knowledge, etc., when staying in a 
certain place for a longer period. Binding forces are also supposed to come from being socially 
embedded. In addition to these keep-factors, we made a plea for including repel-factors as well. 
These would be factors that can be linked to a potential destination region, such as resentment 
towards foreigners, unfavourable regional images, and these factors might prevent people from going 
there. 
Even this extended approach, however, would still fit into the tradition of rational choice 
approaches. It presupposes that there are actors who are constantly in a process of deliberation, who 
are engaged in weighing the pros and cons of different places or regions. In other words, it supposes 
in our case that there are actors who are willing and also able to evaluate between the difference in 
the HERE and THERE (on the other side of the border). We would like to qualify this image of 
economic rational actors. In everyday life, most workers do not continuously make a rational 
cost/benefit-analysis based on some kind of choice between staying at home or going abroad. To cope 
with this second fallacy, we would like to make a plea for including a threshold of indifference in the 
explanation of labour immobility.  
 
The importance of indifference 
 
In order to explain what is meant by indifference, it is important to elaborate first a bit on the 
rationality of belonging. Within the EU the urge of people to claim a part of space as theirs is very 
strong.20 This can be explained by the strong need to belong somewhere or to feel at home in a place. 
An ever expanding EU seems increasingly less capable of playing the role of a place of belonging. 
                                                           
18 Ernst G. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,” Journal of the Statistical Society 48 (1885) pp.167-235; Ernst 
G. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,” Journal of the Statistical Society 52 (1889) pp.241-305. 
19 Thomas Straubhaar, On the Economics of International Labour Migration (Bern: Haupt, 1988). 
20 Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen, “Bordering, Ordering, Othering,” Tijdschrift voor Economische en 
Sociale Geografie 93 (2002) pp.125-136. 
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Consequently, people 
are using other spatial 
frameworks to project 
their feelings. When 
considering this from a 
constructivist point of 
view, this feeling can 
be viewed upon as 
being based on a com-
mon, “natural,” in-
ternalised and compli-
ant behavioural pattern. 
This viewpoint does not 
imply a deterministic 
standpoint in the sense 
that everyone should 
follow this pattern without reserve. It stresses, however, that parts of our everyday practices are 
unravelling in a very obvious way, without being evaluated, contemplated and deliberated extensively. 
When placed in the perspective of cross-border labour markets, national borders still seem to act very 
strongly as the intuitive spatial framework of reference for everyday practices.  
These spatial frameworks are important in the context of unfolding what is presumed to be 
rational behaviour. One of the consequences in this process of defining a space of belonging is that a 
mental distance is created between places on both sides of a border. At the same time, a space of ease 
and comfort is created on someone’s own side of the border, in which mental nearness exists: WE in 
the HERE versus THEY in the THERE. Once again we would like to emphasise that we do not want 
to exhibit a deterministic stance, but nevertheless it is also difficult and even unwise to ignore this 
process when considering cross-border interaction. One important consequence of this process is that 
a space of indifference is created;21 a space that is not (consciously or unconsciously) included in the 
search for a new job. It creates (consciously or unconsciously) a threshold that has to be overcome 
before the THERE is included in the search for a job (Figure 3). 
This scheme tries to elucidate the spatial “dynamics” of which only one of the possible 
outcomes is mobility on the labour market. When a large group of people exhibit an indifferent 
attitude towards job opportunities on the other side of the border, symbolised in the top box of the 
scheme, then only a small group can “enter” the bottom part of the scheme, the active attitude part.  
This symbolises what is usually called “rational” decision-making. Based on an evaluation 
of the characteristics and opportunities of the present (home) and a possible new location (away), a 
decision is made to become either mobile (go) or to stay (stay). This “model” emphasises the 
importance of immobility. Immobility is the rule, mobility is the aberration, certainly if we realise 
                                                           
21 Henk van Houtum, “Borders of Comfort,” Regional and Federal Studies 12 (2003) pp.37-58. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3  The Threshold of Indifference 
Source: Martin van der Velde, Manfred Janssen and Henk van Houtum, “Job mobility in 
the Dutch-German regional labour market. The threshold of indifference” in: 
Borders and economic behaviour in Europe (eds.), Gerrit van Vilsteren and 
Egbert Wever (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2005) pp77-96. 
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that in the EU-15 only 2 out of every 100 people are cross-border mobile. Hence, studying 
immobility might be just as important and relevant to understanding mobility as studying mobility 
itself. This idea is also supported by empirical data presented in a case study in a small sample of 
respondents in the Nijmegen region, who were actively looking for a job. Two-thirds indicated being 
indifferent towards including Germany in their search. 
 
Unfamiliarity 
 
Where indifference can be used to better understand immobility, the second concept of 
unfamiliarity can be used in the context of (policies to stimulate) mobility.22 We use the “bandwidth 
of unfamiliarity” concept in an attempt to scrutinize how and why functional, physical, and socio-
cultural differences discourage and encourage cross-border shopping practices, but of course it can be 
used with other topics as well.  
Using unfamiliarity in a “bandwidth” context is not completely new considering that already 
in 1985 Bauman posited that “the tourist is a conscious and systematic seeker of experience, of a new 
and different experience, of the experience of difference and novelty – as the joys of the familiar wear 
off quickly and cease to allure.”23 More recently also Edensor acknowledged that “[t]he strategy … is 
that difference must be acknowledged but carefully limited and tamed, as in the selective 
commodification of ‘exotic’ items throughout spaces of consumption.”24 
In scrutinizing the differences, they are recategorised into emotional and rational differences 
between countries. This was done for mainly analytical purposes. In fact, it would be almost 
impossible to draw a clear line between emotionality and rationality. Some shoppers may perceive 
price differences, for instance, as a rational reason to cross the border whereas others might 
experience the fun of finding the cheapest price for the same product, pointing at an emotional 
shopping motive. However, clearly distinguishing emotionality and rationality is not our aim here. 
The goal is to understand how rational and emotional differences could be used to explain cross-
border shopping (im)mobility and the bandwidth is used as an instrument to achieve this.  
The “bandwidth of unfamiliarity” consists of two arbitrarily placed and shifting blocks of 
rational and emotional differences. It shows what level of unfamiliarity shoppers are willing to accept 
during cross-border practices (Figure 4).  
Rational and emotional differences between places falling within their bandwidth function as 
push or pull factors. These differences are perceived as acceptable as well as appealing and therefore 
                                                           
22 For a more extensive discussion and empirical underpinnings of the concept, see Bas Spierings and Martin van 
der Velde, “Shopping, borders and unfamiliarity: Consumer mobility in Europe,” Tijdschrift voor Economische 
en Sociale Geografie 99 (2008) pp.497-505; Martin van der Velde and Bas Spierings, “Consumer Mobility and 
the Communication of Difference: Reflecting on Cross-border Shopping Practices and Experiences in the Dutch-
German Borderland,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 25 (2010) pp.191-205. 
23 Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) p. 96. 
24 Tim Edensor, “Mundane Mobilities, Performances and Spaces of Tourism,” Social & Cultural Geography 8 
(2007) p.209. 
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stimulate cross-border 
shopping. Push factors 
imply that consumers 
consider shopping 
centres at home less 
appealing than in 
foreign places. This 
encourages cross-
border mobility. The 
same goes for pull 
factors because they 
imply that foreign 
shopping centres are 
perceived as more 
attractive than 
shopping possibilities 
in the home country. 
Differences falling 
outside the bandwidth function are keep or repel factors. These differences are perceived as too large 
and unacceptable. As a consequence, international mobility is discouraged and even prevented. Keep 
factors imply that shopping centres at home are seen as more appealing than shopping possibilities on 
the other side of the border. This encourages cross-border immobility. Repel factors also stimulate the 
immobility of consumers when they perceive foreign places as less attractive for shopping than places 
at home. The more international dissimilarities shoppers perceive as push and pull factors and the less 
differences as keep and repel factors, the more cross-border interaction is expected to occur.  
Different people may have different perceptions of “familiarity” and acceptable 
“unfamiliarity.” There might be dissimilar ideas of what rational and emotional differences operate as 
push, pull, keep or repel factors. The willingness of shoppers to accept cross-border differences could 
also change during the course of time. The communication of knowledge of international differences, 
for instance, may rearrange what people consider as “familiar” and acceptably “unfamiliar.” For 
instance marketing plans for shopping centres “on the other side” could cause the shifting of blocks 
of rational and emotional differences (pointing at the dynamics of the bandwidth). Communicating 
cross-border differences may focus on changing unacceptable differences into acceptable differences. 
In the case of effective communication processes, shoppers will see more reasons to cross borders. 
The strength of push and pull factors simultaneously grows and the strength of keep and repel factors 
simultaneously declines, causing the blocks of rational and/or emotional differences to shift to the left 
and the right respectively. This implies that more cross-border interaction will take place. However, 
efforts focusing on the insignificance of international dissimilarities and on disappearing acceptable 
differences could cause the opposite effect. In fact, the strength of push and pull factors together may 
diminish and the strength of keep and repel factors may simultaneously increase (causing the blocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  The Bandwidth of Unfamiliarity 
Source: Martin van der Velde and Bas Spierings, “Consumer Mobility and the
Communication of Difference: Reflecting on Cross-border Shopping Practices
and Experiences in the Dutch-German Borderland,” Journal of Borderlands
Studies, 25 (2010) pp.191-205. 
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of rational and/or emotional differences to shift to the right and the left respectively). This means that 
cross-border immobility is encouraged. Thus, paradoxically, the construction of borders and “the 
communication of cross-border” as well as appealing differences seem a prerequisite for sustaining 
and encouraging shopping mobility. More precisely, foreign shopping centres promising the 
experience of “familiar unfamiliarity” seem to have an appeal on shoppers and promote cross-border 
interaction. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Starting from the observation that the apparent abolishing of borders has not led to the 
supposed increase in cross-border interaction and the notion that borders are not only technical 
barriers, two concepts have been introduced, indifference and unfamiliarity, that can be used in trying 
to understand border effects, especially in Europe and the EU. 
The concepts are challenging two EU-discourses, firstly that debordering will lead 
automatically to increasing levels of mobility and interaction. This also puts the mobility paradigm of 
the EU, where mobility is a goal in itself, instead of a means to reach the ultimate goal of 
development and cohesion, into a different perspective. Immobility is a strong and persistent strategy. 
Secondly, the hypothesis that the current trend and strive for homogenization through 
integration will lead to the wished for levels of interaction, is questioned. In order to get the people 
mobile, especially across borders, there should be a reason to do so, in other words, some kind of 
attracting force is needed. 
Efforts for stimulating and enhancing European integration have had until now rather 
disappointing results in border regions. No real proof of cross-border regional convergence can be 
witnessed. Some therefore make a plea to downplay the European integration discourse in which 
borders are almost exclusively understood as barriers that have to be overcome. According to Ernste 
for instance, borders should be interpreted as a “regional asset,” that has to be “cultivated and 
celebrated.”25 This discourse does not consider the border as something that is irrelevant. On the 
contrary, the border is regarded as something highly relevant and exploitable. What has to be done is 
to make the inhabitants of the border-regions aware of these differences along the border, and 
consequently of each other. The “other” side should stay and/or be made relevant and attractive. In 
that case people should be encouraged to change their mental disposition towards the border, or to be 
more precise, towards the other side. To consider the “other” side, including its differences and 
(un)familiarity, is as relevant as it is a necessary, albeit insufficient, precondition for interaction. 
                                                           
25 Huib Ernste, “Border Regions Seen in a New Perspective” in Gerrit van Vilsteren and Egbert Wever (eds.), 
Borders and Economic Behaviour in Europe (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2005) pp.96-116. 
